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The di⁄erent organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant em-
pires a⁄ected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of
these di⁄erences using micro data of overseas workers￿compensation from the sixteenth
to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used signi￿cantly di⁄erent com-
pensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus
share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These
results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to
the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.
KEYWORDS: Merchant Empires, Labor Compensation, Monitoring
11 Introduction
Since the beginning of the European overseas expansion in the ￿fteenth century, attracting
individuals to risky ultramarine ventures was a major challenge for long-distance trade com-
panies. Despite royal or merchant ownership, all companies faced the classic agency problem:
how to motivate employees to work hard in distant locations where they could not only shirk,
but also engage in activities that reduced the company￿ s returns (e.g. smuggling). Standard
labor theory tells us that when monitoring is costly, principals can induce workers￿e⁄ort by
linking compensation to performance, such as with the use of bonuses, but when monitoring
is free, principals may retain a larger surplus of production by paying ￿xed wages.1
This paper presents historical evidence on the labor compensation of overseas workers in
the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires. On average, Portugal paid a larger portion of
labor compensation in the form of bonus than the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde
Oost-Indische Compagnie, henceforth VOC).2 If the standard labor theory is right, the mer-
chant controlled company in the Netherlands would have had a better information structure
relative to the crown controlled enterprise in Portugal. These di⁄erences have stark theoret-
ical implications.
I propose a standard Principal-Agent model to illustrate such implications. Better infor-
mation on shirking workers led to contracts o⁄ering ￿ at wages and low bonuses. A richer
information structure was however more expensive. Such an investment might not have been
optimal for every ￿rm, in which case contracts would o⁄er low wages and high bonuses. I
analyze these implications using archival data on the labor compensation of Portuguese and
Dutch workers overseas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The results show
marked di⁄erences between these two groups of workers, even after controlling for workers￿
1Bonuses are not the only way to deal with monitoring issues. Refer to the appendix for a discussion of
the use of e¢ ciency wages in the VOC.
2This evidence provides additional support to the theory explaining the emergence of di⁄erent organiza-
tional structures of merchant empires presented in Rei (2010): di⁄erences in the distribution of endowments
between the king and the merchants implied di⁄erent structures in the organization of trading companies
￿Portugal￿ s king remained the residual claimant of the enterprise, whereas in the Netherlands control was
delegated to the merchants.
2location, sector, and rank.
Even though there is no direct evidence on the quality of workers￿monitoring in merchant
empires, it can be proxied by the information structure present in each ￿rm. Merchants
pursuing long-distance trade in a king-controlled ￿rm are less accountable than merchants
working in a similar ￿rm of their own. In the latter, monitoring is likely to be easier and the
information structure better. Monitoring is therefore exogenous in the context of this paper,
as it is determined by the choice of the ￿rm￿ s organizational form. The model explains the
di⁄erences in the structure of labor compensation conditional on the (king or merchant)
control structure; it does not explain the choice of monitoring levels. Compensation schemes
are chosen optimally given the principal￿ s monitoring ability: larger bonuses are o⁄ered when
monitoring is hard, as opposed to larger wages when monitoring is easy.
Incentives to induce workers￿e⁄ort, both in terms of bonuses and wages, have been the
subject of a lengthy theoretical literature.3 The use of bonus in non-linear compensation
schemes has been analyzed in the context of performance standards (Murphy 2000). Wages
on the other hand, have been subject of study in as di⁄erent contexts as deferred compen-
sation or e¢ ciency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984 and Salop and Salop 1976).
The empirical work across the ￿elds of organization and personnel economics is quite
thin. Krueger (1991) ￿nds di⁄erences in compensation schemes between company-owned
and franchise-owned ￿rms, which suggest that monitoring a⁄ects the compensation struc-
ture. Hejeebu (2005) does not focus on alternative organizational forms, but rather addresses
the complementarity of private trade and labor compensation to deal with the moral hazard
problem in the British East India Company, suggesting yet alternative ways to deal with
monitoring di¢ culties. Finally, Carlos (1992) examines the contract structure by the Hud-
son￿ s Bay Company and the Royal African Company in order to deal with the problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection associated with long-distance trade.
In this paper I look not at bonuses or wages per se. Rather, I provide an explanation for
3For an overview of the general literature see Lazear 1995, Gibbons 1996, and Prendergast 1999.
3their relative size, which illuminates the historical evidence we have on the compensation of
overseas workers in merchant empires.
2 Di⁄erent, Yet Similar Merchant Empires
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the establishment of direct trade connections
between Europe and the East.
All merchant empires hired workers in Europe to send them o⁄to Asia in perilous vessels
where the probability of dying, either from shipwreck or disease, was non-negligible.4 In
addition, the Eastern destinations of these workers were often stricken by military con￿ ict
either with local rulers, or with competing empires. The compensation package o⁄ered to
these workers had to provide a premium that accounted for overseas location, workers￿skill,
and risk faced. Moreover, incentives had to be in place in order to hire trustworthy workers
who would e⁄ectively run the empire on the spot, whereas the owner of the monopoly
remained safely in Europe. These were challenges faced by all merchant empires which,
however engaged similar long distance trades, organized businesses very di⁄erently.
Since 1498, Portugal￿ s merchant empire in the East was established as a crown monopoly
with the king as the ultimate residual claimant of pro￿ts. In the East, the Portuguese empire
was rooted in three basic pillars: the all-sea-route to India, diplomatic agreements with local
rulers from the eastern coast of Africa to the Spice Islands, and the establishment of fortresses
in strategic geographical locations along the way and in the East Indies (Boxer 1969). The
ultimate goal was to control all the spice trade in the Indian Ocean by exacting taxes on
all ships, thereby blocking the Levant trade and becoming the unique middleman between
Europe and Asia in an extremely pro￿table business.5 In the East, the Portuguese empire
was headquartered in Goa where a viceroy centralized the all governance from Mozambique
4For example, in Vasco Da Gama￿ s 1498 voyage to India about two-thirds of the original crew succumbed
to scurvy (Sanceau 1967).
5The net pro￿t rate on pepper imported to Lisbon was between 89 to 152 percent in 1558 (Phillips 1990).
Although pepper was the staple traded spice, others (cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg and ginger) could achieve
even higher pro￿t rates.
4to Macau, in the name of the king of Portugal (Di¢ e and Winius 1977).
The Dutch had a similar trade policy in the East to the Portuguese since the foundation of
the VOC in 1602: they exerted territorial control through agreements with local sovereigns
establishing trade exclusivity, and also destroyed spice surpluses to enable price control
(Morris 1904, Hamilton 1948, Ames 2008).
In other aspects however, the Netherlands￿ s empire had a very di⁄erent approach to that
of Portugal. The VOC was a chartered monopoly, belonging to a group of private merchants.
The residual claimants of the enterprise were the Heeren XVII, a board of seventeen delegates
located in the Netherlands and selected from the managing shareholders of the original six
chambers. The Dutch government had no direct involvement in Eastern trade other than
the natural return on customs duties and the payments at every renewal of the company￿ s
charter. In the East, the VOC was centralized in Batavia, the seat of the governor-general
who responded directly to the Heeren XVII (De Vries and van der Woude 1997). The
governor-general e⁄ectively administered the company￿ s activities in Asia ￿with outposts
from the Cape of Good Hope to Taiwan ￿and was advised by the Council of the Indies
(Raad van Indiº, RVI), which was also created to prevent possible despotic tendencies.
Other than organizational design, there were also other noteworthy di⁄erences across
empires, such as the concern with religion. Beyond their trade interests, the Portuguese
were also fervent converters of souls. The Dutch did not share the latter objective, possibly
because they had no king controlling the enterprise, in which case religion was a consequence
of organizational control rather than a causal di⁄erence.6 This matter goes beyond the scope
of this paper, but even if religion were a pertinent di⁄erence across merchant empires, its
relation with the compensation structure is unclear.
Most relevant is perhaps the emergence of the Portuguese and Dutch companies more
6The case of England is perhaps more striking. Similar to the VOC, the English East India Company was
controlled by the merchants and never exhibited any religious interest. We know, however, that the English
crown founded its own religion in the sixteenth century, and prosecuted those who were still followers of
Rome. It would therefore not be surprising to see the same interest in religion in the English empire had
the English monarch been in charge of Eastern trade. This fascinating topic, is not addressed in this paper.
5than one hundred years apart: 1498 and 1602, respectively. In the mean time the Dutch
could have invented better monitoring techniques, or learned from Portugal￿ s mistakes, which
could have a⁄ected the type of compensation package o⁄ered.
Though this learning hypothesis is hard to dismiss, it is equally hard to imagine such
a radical innovation in pre-industrial times of slow inter-continental communication. The
￿rst successful European voyage to the East lasted a little over tow years: Da Gama sailed
o⁄ of Lisbon on July 8, 1497 and returned on July 10, 1499 (Sanceau 1967:217-8). By the
Dutch golden age in the seventeenth century, the length of the round-trip was practically
the same: the VOC￿ s ships would depart the Netherlands in the spring of each year, ar-
rived in Batavia nine months later, and sailed back between November and March, arriving
Amsterdam by the end of the following year (De Vries and van der Woude 1997:389). The
intact duration of the long commercial cycle dictated by the distance and the monsoons,
suggests the irrelevance of technological innovations in the sailing ship over the time period
in which both the Portuguese and the Dutch faced similar di¢ culties in communication and
coordination of operations between Europe and Asia. The high degree of autonomy of the
Portuguese viceroy and the Dutch governor-general, as well as of other higher o¢ cials in
Asia, was unavoidable, which made e¢ cient monitoring a matter of the utmost importance.
Despite the di⁄erences across empires, Portugal and the Netherlands faced equal chal-
lenges with respect to the recruiting and choice of compensation structure of European
workers in which the type of organization could have had relevant implications. Oliver
Williamson, taught us that organizational control at the top manifests throughout the ￿rm,
either in its design, in its policies, in its inner workings, and ultimately in its long-run per-
formance (Williamson 1975). The next section o⁄ers an illustrative model to explain the
link between organizational control and the personnel economics of merchant empires.
63 A Model of Labor Compensation
There are two parties: a Principal, the manager of the venture, who works in a company
either controlled by the king or the merchants. Among other tasks, the principal is in charge
of designing labor contracts that induce workers￿e⁄ort, and is risk neutral in income; and
an Agent, the worker hired in Europe to work in Asia, who is risk averse in income, and has
preferences u(w) ￿ a with u0 > 0, u00 < 0.7
The agent can either shirk or work a = f0;1g. Either action is unobservable by the
principal (located in Europe), who delegates monitoring in exchange for a signal indicating
if the worker is diligent (￿1) or not (￿0).8 Better monitoring costs more.
The principal prefers an agent who works (a = 1), whereas the agent prefers to shirk
(a = 0). The distribution of signal values depends on the agent￿ s e⁄ort choice: if a = 1
(a = 0), ￿1 (￿0) arrives with probability p (q < p) and ￿0 (￿1) with probability 1￿p (1￿q).
The precision of the signal, and the cost of monitoring, is given by ￿ = p ￿ q; the larger
the ￿, the more informative (and costly) the signal, and the easier it is to monitor workers.
The principal ties the agent￿ s payo⁄ to the observed signal: w1 if ￿1 is observed, and w0 if
￿0 is observed.
Conditional on the information structure ￿, the principal minimizes the expected labor




s:t: pu(w1) + (1 ￿ p)u(w0) ￿ 1 ￿ qu(w1) + (1 ￿ q)u(w0)
pu(w1) + (1 ￿ p)u(w0) ￿ 1 ￿ u
7I do not consider locally hired workers for several reasons: very likely these workers would be hired for
low skilled and/or temporary occupations (e.g. loading ships), easier to monitor; workers hired in Asia to
work in Asia would be monitored (and paid) locally and would have less of a moral hazard problem. Such
workers are not observed in the data.
8In the standard principal-agent model pro￿t is a possible measure of performance to which the Principal
may tie the Agent￿ s payo⁄. In this paper I separate pro￿tability from the information structure, hence the
signal notation. The results do not depend on this speci￿cation.





which indicates that the less informative the signal, the larger the payo⁄ dispersion. In the
two-state model the contract is determined entirely by the two constraints, both of which
bind. The result is:
u(w0) = u + 1 ￿
p
￿




Poor monitoring (low ￿) increases the gap between payo⁄s associated with of good (w1)
and bad signals (w0). If we interpret w0 as the wage, and w1 ￿ w0 as the bonus, then the




v(u + 1 ￿
p
￿)
v(u + 1 +
1￿p
￿ )
, where v(:) = u
￿1(:).
Since v(:) is increasing, the bonus share falls in ￿.
The predictions of the model are straightforward: better information leads to less reliance
on bonuses. Lower bonus shares imply lower expected compensation. Thus, while high values
of ￿ minimize compensation costs, they are also more onerous since better information is
more expensive. In the less e¢ cient organization, the principal earns a lower return from
every investment, including monitoring, and therefore there is less of it, this in turn will lead
to the design of a labor contract with greater use of bonuses relative to wages, an implication
that can be assessed in the data.
84 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The Portuguese data were extracted from an original manuscript written ca. 1582 (Luz
1960). Portugal￿ s loss of independence to Spain in 1580 brings the former Portuguese empire
in the East under the control of the Spanish king, to whom this manuscript was addressed.
The document ￿whose author remains anonymous, though Luz speculates him to be a former
high secretary of state ￿seems to have had the purpose of providing information about the
conditions of the newly acquired eastern empire. In this sense, the data cannot be taken as
representative of year 1582 alone, but rather as a summary of almost one hundred years of
Portuguese operations in the East. With the exception of the island of Ternate, by 1582 the
Portuguese strongholds in the East remained intact since the 1520s the decade of the last
conquests in Asia.
The document is divided in seventeen chapters each providing a detailed description of
a Portuguese stronghold in the Indian Ocean from Mozambique in East Africa, to Ternate
in the Southeastern Archipelago (now Indonesia), and also Macao in China.9
A typical chapter starts with the description of the location (town or fortress), its ge-
ographic characteristics (peninsula, island, mountains or plains), its local rulers (usually
vassals of the Portuguese crown), and sometimes the type of buildings as well as the charac-
teristics of local inhabitants or the type of products traded (or produced) in each location.
The author then goes in detail over the list of all job positions in that same location and
respective compensation provided by the king of Portugal.10 All seventeen chapters together
give us the complete set of job positions (e.g. captains, factors, scribes, etc. in Goa, Ormuz,
Mozambique, etc.) of the Portuguese empire.
Labor compensation is composed of two parts: a yearly ￿xed wage paid by the Royal
9See Figure 3 for a detailed map of the Portuguese controlled cities in the late sixteenth century corre-
sponding to the data extracted from the document.
10In the preface, Luz notes that the description is not merely statistical. The author often provides
additional comments on the current state of a given location or job post as well as his critical opinion on
as diverse issues as territorial defense or the nomination of personnel. Such statements help us understand
the circumstances a› icting the Portuguese empire at the time, as well as the management and personnel
practices within the ￿rm.
9Treasury, and a variable bonus in kind, in the form of imports of spices, for which the author
provides the corresponding value over three years ￿the term of the contract.11 The bonus
varied with each location￿ s trade conditions (e.g. war, good agricultural year) and worker￿ s
e⁄ort, for which the author is very explicit. Many a time, the author mentions that a given
post accrued a certain value of bonus in the past, but such was no longer the case because
of war, or because current workers were not as diligent as former ones. Also, the values are
often mentioned as an upper bound, e.g. ￿The vice-royal post could import, if served with
honest conscience for the time period of three years, sixty to seventy thousand cruzados,
which include the ￿fths of the appraisals and seizings of Moor ships, yielding more or less
imports according to the quantity and quality of appraisals￿(Luz 1960:9-10).
There is a total of 198 observations, corresponding to overseas job posts of Portuguese
workers, all of which provided by the monarch in Portugal and paid by the Royal Treasury.12
The Dutch data were collected from Lequin (1982), which provides a detailed historical
study of the personnel of the VOC. The appendix of this volume shares a wide range of
information concerning the VOC￿ s administration. Among the collection, Lequin provides
the complete career records of 115 VOC workers who spent some time of their careers in
Bengal between 1669 and 1799, a year before the formal dissolution of the company.
From the year of entry to that of exit, Lequin observes each worker￿ s name, place of
birth, date of entry, chamber of origin within the company, civil status (when known), age
at entry (when known), location and corresponding date, occupation with corresponding
monthly wage and date, date of promotion with corresponding occupation and monthly
wage, motive for exit, total career payments in wages (used as wages in the Dutch package),
total career remittances to the family in Netherlands (part of the worker￿ s salary), and total
career payments in kind (spices) in the form of exports to the Netherlands. This last item is
equivalent to the Portuguese payments in spices, and it is similarly interpreted as the bonus
11Workers could have been rehired after the three-year contract. The author is silent on this matter.
12The Portuguese administration in the East certainly hired locally to the most various tasks (e.g. load
and unload ships), but those jobs are not in the data.
10in the Dutch compensation package. Like the Portuguese, all Dutch workers in the sample
were hired in their home country.13
The Dutch dataset focuses on individual workers, allowing for a long run analysis of the
careers in the VOC over more than a century. The Portuguese dataset, on the other hand,
focuses on job posts and therefore does not provide as much detail. In terms of compensation
structure I can, however, analyze both cases through the same lens as I have information
on career wages and bonuses for both. Moreover, even though the time frames of the two
datasets do not coincide, both occur when the two empires were already well established in
the East, therefore both samples are comparable.
Table 1 shows the bonus shares in the Portuguese and Dutch ￿rms, a convenient variable
to analyze as it abstracts from the di⁄erent monetary units in the two samples. The average
Portuguese bonus share is larger than the Dutch counterpart by a magnitude of 1:65.14 Also,
the Portuguese shares are more dispersed than the Dutch, with a standard deviation almost
doubled (:396 and :209, respectively) and the median more distant from the average.15
To address the learning hypothesis, I divided the Dutch workers in two groups according
to the date they enter the sample (before and after 1724) in order to observe if better
monitoring techniques would have lowered the need to use bonuses in a later stage. What
we in fact observe is the opposite. Dutch workers entering the VOC after 1724 have higher
bonus shares of compensation than workers entering before that year, that is, the older the
VOC, the closer the compensation structure becomes to the Portuguese enterprise controlled
by the crown. This phenomenon may be associated with the decline of the VOC, but it does
not really endorse the learning theory.16
13Of the 115 observed workers, seven were born in Asia but their ￿rst and last names are European. I
therefore assume that they were descendants of VOC workers and not locally hired labor for low skilled
occupations, which makes these workers comparable to the rest of the workers hired in the Netherlands.
14The Portuguese and Dutch averages are statistically di⁄erent from each other.
15It may be argued that the VOC may have compensated their workers with promotions instead of bonuses,
which re￿ ects in the observed pattern. This story however, does not contradict the monitoring argument:
a promotion strategy likely requires more and closer monitoring of workers, than associating bonuses with
observed outcomes. If indeed the VOC chose promotions over bonuses as opposed to the Portuguese company,
then this is just another manifestation of divergent organizational control.
16The result is identical if the date of exit (and not entry) is taken into account.
11The preliminary evidence on Table 1 is consistent with the model￿ s predictions that the
king controlled enterprise (Portugal) is associated with a poor information structure, which,
according to the model, elicits a compensation structure with larger bonuses.
In the event Portuguese workers were re-hired after the three year term of the contract
there can be three possible scenarios regarding the bonus share: (a) it is equal to that of
the ￿rst contract, in which case the proportion is constant throughout the career; (b) it is
higher than the bonus share of the ￿rst contract in which case the career bonus share for
Portuguese workers is actually higher than the reported on Table 1; (c) it is lower than the
bonus share of the ￿rst contract, which seems implausible ￿if a worker were to be re-hired
after the ￿rst three years he would likely be a good worker, therefore there would be no
reason to penalize him. In the plausible scenarios of (a) and (b) the relationship between
Portuguese and Dutch shares reported on Table 1 remains intact.
The data allow for a more complete analysis of the compensation structure, as detailed
information on worker￿ s location, sector (both explicitly stated in both documents), and
rank is available. These variables could be a⁄ecting the structure of labor compensation
according to the following hypothesis: (H1) workers in spice-producing locations, such as
Indonesia, may have been easier to monitor than workers in other locations not providing a
tangible outcome, where worker productivity could have been harder to assess. Such is the
case of administrative regions of Goa and Bengal in India, other relatively less productive
spice locations in the Malabar coast (Southwest India), or even locations that were kept only
for strategic purposes, such as the Cape of Good Hope or Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. To
account for these di⁄erences, I divided locations into India, Indonesia and Other Regions;
(H2) workers in the civil sector may be easier to monitor than workers in the sea or military
sectors because they were less mobile, therefore I divided occupations into sectors of activity
￿Civil, Sea, and Military; (H3) high rank jobs may encompass more complex tasks, which
may be harder to monitor and therefore o⁄er higher bonuses on average, so I constructed two
variables concerning the rank of each job post based on the hierarchical ladder of each ￿rm,
12provided in each document: from the middle of the hierarchy up I classi￿ed the position as
high rank, otherwise as low rank.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The Portuguese document provides a
survey of job posts, therefore the descriptive statistics are extracted directly from the data.
In the Dutch case this required some treatment: since I have complete career paths, the
statistics reported in Table 2 show workers￿location, sector, and rank for each worker in
more than 50% of his career.17 The majority of the observations are located in India, though
this is driven mainly by Portuguese workers. Both countries have a large majority of workers
in the civil sector, and have 64% of the workers in a low rank job.
5 Results
Consider the following baseline regression for worker j
bij
bij + wij
= ￿0 + ￿1d(Crown) + ￿2d(Hi) + ￿3d(Crown) ￿ d(Hi) + "ij, with i = 1;2;3
where the left-hand side represents worker j￿ s bonus share of compensation; d(Crown) is a
dummy if the ￿rm is controlled by the king ￿a proxy for the information structure according
to the model ￿ ; d(Hi) a dummy for worker j￿ s location, sector or rank hypotheses described
above (H1 = Indonesia, H2 = Civil, H3 = Low, respectively);18 and "ij the error term.
Given the tendencies on Table 1 we would expect a positive correlation between the bonus
share and a ￿rm controlled by the crown ￿1 > 0. The Location, Sector and Rank hypotheses
lead us to expect ￿2 to be negative for all Hi. Coe¢ cient ￿3 explores the di⁄erence in
17Starting and ￿nishing variables vary considerably: most Dutch workers arrived in Batavia ￿Indonesia
￿and ￿nished their careers in Bengal ￿India; most workers (64%) started in the civil sector, but almost all
others transferred to this sector at some point in their careers and a total of 97% are last observed in the
civil sector. Career progress in the VOC was very clear: 90% of the workers started in low rank positions
but only 36% are last observed as such, and about half of those died on the job. These di⁄erences do not
change the results.
18Though the categorical variables of Location and Sector can take more than two values, I am interested
in the e⁄ects of working in a high spice producing location and working in the civil sector, therefore I estimate
those coe¢ cients with a single dummy.
13treatment of workers in ￿rms with di⁄erent monitoring, with respect to the di⁄erence in
treatment regarding each of the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3.
There are eighty-one workers with zero bonus (￿fty-six Portuguese and twenty-￿ve Dutch),
which makes the dependent variable zero for a non-trivial number of observations (26%). A
standard linear model would weight these zeros as any other observation, which would result
in negative ￿tted values, when
bj
bj+wj can never be negative. The results reported on Table 3
use a Tobit model to take care of this problem.19
The ￿rst three columns in Table 3 test H1, H2 and H3 separately, while the last tests all
three hypotheses jointly. Coe¢ cient ￿1 is positive and signi￿cant on all tests. Long-distance
trade organized as a crown monopoly seems to have been associated with the way overseas
workers were paid: working for the Portuguese king meant, on average, a higher fraction
of compensation in the form of bonus. The Location hypothesis (H1) is not supported by
the data: the bonus share of compensation was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent for workers in
the administrative areas of India (mostly Goa and Bengal) and workers in spice producing
regions of Indonesia. The Sector (H2) and Rank (H3) hypotheses on the other hand, o⁄er
signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the single variable and/or the cross product: civil servants seem
to have received larger bonus shares contrary to H2, which however seems to still prevail
for Portuguese civil servants, given the negative sign on the cross product in the second
column; H3 seems to be veri￿ed for Portuguese workers alone, with a negative and signi￿cant
coe¢ cient on the cross product, while the coe¢ cient for low rank per se is not signi￿cant.
The last column in Table 3 includes all explanatory variables and cross products. Again
the coe¢ cient on Crown is positive and highly signi￿cant even after controlling for all
other variables that may have been a⁄ecting the bonus share. The high magnitude of ￿1
however, should be interpreted carefully because the estimated constant (equivalent to the
Dutch average in the absence of any controls) is negative though not signi￿cant. Again,
the rank hypothesis seems veri￿ed for Portuguese workers with a negative and signi￿cant
19OLS regressions yielded the same signs and signi￿cance levels of the estimates of Crown, but it did not
con￿rm any of the hypotheses.
14coe¢ cient, which if summed with ￿1 indicates that on average Portugal paid a bonus share
of compensation 53:1% higher than the Netherlands.20
The di⁄erence in magnitude of bonus shares could be associated with the construction of
the data, which attributes location, sector and rank of Dutch workers to the place, industry
or category in which they spent more than 50% of their careers. The initial 30% of Dutch
careers could have been spent in low-wage/high-bonus location or sector or rank, while the
last 70% in the reverse (high-wage/low-bonus location or sector or rank). The classi￿cation
criterion only captures the latter part of the Dutch careers, helping the model and if the
pattern was similar for Portuguese workers (of which I only capture the initial contracts)
then the model fully explains the arti￿cial result.
Columns (NL) and (PT) on Table 3 clearly demystify this conjecture. First, the only
signi￿cant explanatory variable in the Dutch regression is that of the civil sector, to which
all but two workers transfer to and spend most of their careers on; since Civil is positively
signi￿cant, Dutch workers in the civil sector were associated with higher bonus shares and
not the opposite as the conjecture above expects. Second, for Portuguese workers the only
signi￿cant variable is Low rank, which is associated with lower bonus shares; even though
64% of Portuguese workers belong to this category, we still observe higher bonus shares for
Portuguese workers relative to the Dutch.
The issues on data construction may be surpassed, but we may still have a problem with
the datasets: even though the information from both is comparable, Portuguese data are
expected compensation as established in the three-year term contract, whereas the Dutch
data are realized compensation values throughout the worker￿ s career (twenty-two years on
average). It is plausible to argue that both ￿rms had similar contractual arrangements, but
that the observed di⁄erences in bonus shares are due to the assumption that Portuguese
20For further investigation on whether the di⁄erences in the compensation structure are accounted by the
ease of monitoring I also estimated separate tobits using Portuguese and Dutch data. Results show that
the estimated coe¢ cients are jointly signi￿cantly di⁄erent. A decomposition of the average bonus shares
shows that the observable country di⁄erences explain only 13% of the gap, leaving 87% to di⁄erences in the
estimated coe¢ cients.
15workers in the sample have completed their contract, whereas Dutch workers may not have.
Table 4 shows the reasons for Dutch workers exiting the sample. Assuming that workers
departing the East or arriving the Netherlands completed their contract, 70% of the workers
have incomplete career paths, which may distort the observed bonus shares of the Dutch
empire. If the VOC￿ s personnel policy was one in which age-earnings pro￿les paid less than
the value of marginal productivity for young workers and more for old workers (Lazear 1981),
and if bonuses are seen as a reward to be achieved later in the career, then the observed
Dutch bonuses are smaller than what VOC workers could achieve had they all completed
their contracts.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the Portuguese and Dutch bonus shares of compen-
sation. Before addressing contract completeness, it is worth to note that the Portuguese
distribution is more dispersed than the Dutch, which according to the model (speci￿cally,
the binding incentive constraint) is a sign of a poorer information structure in place.
Panel A shows the distributions of the bonus shares for all Portuguese and Dutch workers.
The Portuguese distribution lies to the right of the Dutch distribution indicating a structure
of compensation relying more on bonuses. Panel B shows the bonus shares for all Portuguese
workers, and for Dutch workers that returned to the Netherlands or departed from the East,
that is, Dutch workers with complete contracts. The previous tendency is reinforced: Dutch
workers with complete contracts receive lower bonus shares than Portuguese workers.
The comparison of the Dutch distributions of bonus shares for complete and incomplete
contracts on Figure 2 seems to either disprove Lazear￿ s thesis, or the hypothesis that bonuses
are late career rewards, or both, as Dutch workers with complete contracts are the ones
getting lower bonus shares in the overall distribution.
The concern is now one of selection. It may be the case that Dutch workers who reach
the term of the contract are of lower ability and either never reached high rank occupations,
or self-selected into sectors of activity that were easier to monitor and therefore received
lower bonuses throughout their careers. To account for a possible in￿ uence of contract
16completeness on the bonus shares I include a corresponding dummy variable on the right
hand side of the Tobit estimation while controlling for all other available variables.21
Column (1) on Table 5 shows the Tobit results for Dutch workers. The bonus share does
not seem to be a⁄ected by complete contracts, which is statistically insigni￿cant. Column
(2) reports the results for all Portuguese and Dutch workers controlling for the usual suspects
as well as complete contracts. The coe¢ cient for Crown is still signi￿cant, just as in Table
3 and the result also holds when the cross products are included on column (3).
6 Concluding Remarks
When the European overseas expansion began, countries were faced with a choice of how
to organize their merchant empires. Even though sovereigns shared the same objective and
technology, they chose to organize long-distance trade di⁄erently: the Portuguese opted for
a crown monopoly whereas the Dutch opted by a merchant monopoly. Contract theory
suggests that control at the top has signi￿cant impact in ￿rm￿ s performance as well as
in the way a ￿rm is run. One possible dimension to observe the latter is to analyze the
personnel policies of the di⁄erent merchant empires, which should have varied according to
organizational type.
I use a principal agent model to illustrate the di⁄erences in compensation structures of
merchant empires on the basis of di⁄ering contractual incentives within each of the ￿rms: a
￿rm in which managers have poor incentives to monitor, or in which monitoring is harder,
o⁄ers a compensation package with higher bonuses relative to wages. I then compare the
model￿ s implications with the patterns observed in the compensation schemes of the Por-
tuguese and Dutch overseas workers from the late sixteenth century to the eighteenth century.
The data show that Portuguese workers had a higher share of their total compensation in
the form of bonus than their Dutch counterparts. The result holds even after controlling for
alternative explanations that may be a⁄ecting the ratios, such as worker￿ s location, sector,
21Given the tendencies on Table 4, it is likely that contract completeness is exogenous.
17and rank, and also contract completeness. Given the large number of zeros in the dependent
variable I used a Tobit model.
The di⁄erent compensation schemes in the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires are
consistent with the theoretical implications of the model. In a royally controlled ￿rm with less
delegation of control, monitoring is more di¢ cult when compared to a merchant controlled
enterprise; as a result the compensation structure di⁄ers radically across ￿rms: bonuses are
more prevalent when control is less delegated.
Understanding the alignment of incentives, for example, in terms of the ￿rms￿person-
nel policies, is a step forward to explain the divergent economic performances of merchant
empires and the long term divergence of the respective countries.
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21Figure 1: Distribution of Bonus Shares of Compensation




























0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Bonus Share
NL PT



















































23Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Bonus Shares of Total Compensation
Portugal Netherlands Total NL  early NL  late
Average .600 .363 .511 .287 .425
Median .765 .466 .500 .400 .471
St.  Dev. .396 .209 .358 .240 .156
Min. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Max. 1.00 .895 1.00 .753 .895
N 198 115 313 52 63
Sources:  Lequin  (1982),  Luz  (1960).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: percentage of workers by Location, Occupation and Rank
Portugal Netherlands Total
India 0.73 0.23 0.54
Indonesia 0.11 0.58 0.28
Other 0.16 0.19 0.18
Civil 0.76 0.97 0.83
Sea 0.06 0.03 0.05
Military 0.18 0.00 0.12
Low  rank 0.64 0.64 0.64
High  rank 0.36 0.36 0.36
N 198 115 313
Sources:  Lequin  (1982),  Luz  (1960).
Table 3: Tobit Estimations for the Bonus Share of Compensation
(H1) (H2) (H3) (All) (NL) (PT)
Crown .272*** .803*** .474*** .944*** NO YES
Indonesia .058 .040 .030 - .085
Civil .523* .491* .367** .083
Low  rank .104 .100 .076 - .338***
Crown*Indonesia - .120 - .121
Crown*Civil - .606** - .414
Crown*Low  Rank - .385*** - .413***
_Cons .272*** - .203 .240*** - .258 - .087 .678***
N 313 313 313 313 115 198
Pseudo R
2 .039 .048 .079 .091 .131 .047
Significance:  *10%,  **5%,  ***1%.
24Table 4: Exit Motives for Dutch Workers
# %
Arrival  to  the  Netherlands 15 13
Death 53 46





Table 5: Tobit of Bonus Shares Controlling for Complete Contracts
(1) (2) (3)
Crown NO .155* .890***
Indonesia - .031 .001 .041
Civil .370** .040 .498*
Low  rank .066 - .161*** .088
Complete .062 .117 .076
Crown*Indonesia - .121
Crown*Civil - .420
Crown*Low Rank - .401***
_Cons - .102 .336*** - .281
N 115 313 313
Pseudo R
2 .151 .057 .093
Significance:  *10%,  **5%,  ***1%.
7 Appendix
7.1 E¢ ciency Wages in the VOC
Beyond bonuses, e¢ ciency wages are also a recognized mechanism to deal with monitorign
porblems. In this case, ￿rms choose to pay wages above market clearing levels in order to
attract better workers and avoid moral hazard problems. This mechanism might have been
used in merchant empires, but this hypothesis is hard to evaluate given that wages overseas
had to compensate workers for the high risk associated with their job posts in locations
often a› icted by wars, as well as the non-negligible probability of not concluding the original
voyage to the East due to ship-wreckage. Even so, it is worth to calculate the magnitude by
which overseas wages exceeded those paid in Europe in each empire. Portuguese wage series
are not available.
25The 1755 Lisbon earthquake destroyed two-thirds of the city, including the national
archives, which makes it impossible to evaluate the e¢ ciency wage argument in Portugal.
For the Netherlands the data is available. Allen (2001) calculates Amsterdam wages in
grams of silver per day, whereas O￿ Rourke and Williamson (2005) provide the ratio of grams
of silver per guilder for the relevant years. Combining both I generate Amsterdam￿ s daily
wages in guilders for the same years as VOC￿ s wages also in guilders. Table 6 shows the
average waiting time as well as the monthly wages throughout the VOC career.









waiting  time  (yrs) 9.78 9.01 5.86 5.05 29.71
wage  (mo. florins) 13.3 40 57.5 80 -
Source:  Lequin  (1982).





(years in occupationj￿average monthly wagej ￿ 12)
and get TWP in the VOC conditional on the 22 year career length of the average worker
or the 30 year career of the worker who reaches high hierarchy, shown on Table 7.
Table 7: TWP on the VOC Conditional on Career Length
Career Length in the VOC Conditional Expected Wage Payments
Average 22 years E[TWPjcareer = 22) 8;098:59
High hierarchy 30 years E[TWPjcareer = 30) 14;780:51
Using the 22 and 30 year career lengths for Allen￿ s Amsterdam monthly wages and
assuming that workers spend half of their careers as laborers and half as craftsmen I get
average TWP for Amsterdam workers on Tables 8 and 9, respectively.
26Table 8: Wages in the Netherlands
Amsterdam Monthly Wages (month = 22 days)
Labourers Craftsmen Average
E[TWPjcareer = 22) 5;241:13 7;159:52 6;200:32
E[TWPjcareer = 30) 7;146:99 9;762:98 8;454:99
Table 9: Wages in the Netherlands
Amsterdam Monthly Wages (month = 30 days)
Labourers Craftsmen Average
E[TWPjcareer = 22) 7;146:99 9;762:98 8;454:99
E[TWPjcareer = 30) 9;745:90 13;313:15 11;529:53
Table 10 compares the career wages at the VOC and Amsterdam.
Table 10: VOC Wages Divided by Amsterdam Wages
22 days 30 days
E[
TWPV OC
TWPAmsterdamjcareer = 22) 1:31 0:96
E[
TWPV OC
TWPAmsterdamjcareer = 30) 1:28 1:28
For the regular VOC career of 22 years, the month length becomes relevant: if we consider
a month of 30 working days the expected career wages in the VOC were inferior to those of
Amsterdam, but with a month of 22 working days the VOC salary exceeds Amsterdam￿ s by
31%, the maximum size of the e¢ ciency wage incentive. For the 30-year long VOC career,
assuming the worker would reach the job post of director (a rare event, only 11 out of 115
workers in the sample), the VOC wage payments would exceed Amsterdam￿ s by 28%.
As for the VOC bonus policy, the size of the average bonus (payments in goods) was 63%
of the actual wages paid in the VOC, roughly twice the size of the e¢ ciency wage incentive.
xxxxx VOC wages exceeded those paid in Amsterdam, in the same time period, was
much lower than the size of bonuses relative to wages in the VOC. Bonuses seem to have
been more relevant than e¢ ciency wages in the Dutch empire. xxxx
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